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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to investigate which normative re-
quirements, or axioms, lead to exponential and quasi-hyperbolic forms
of discounting. Exponential discounting has a well-established ax-
iomatic foundation originally developed by Koopmans (1960, 1972)
and Koopmans et al. (1964) with subsequent contributions by sev-
eral other authors, including Bleichrodt et al. (2008). The papers
by Hayashi (2003) and Olea and Strzalecki (2014) axiomatize quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. The main contribution of this paper is to pro-
vide an alternative foundation for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, with simple, transparent axioms and relatively straight-
forward proofs. Using techniques by Fishburn (1982) and Harvey
(1986), we show that Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) version of Sub-
jective Expected Utility theory can be readily adapted to axiomatize
the aforementioned types of discounting, in both finite and infinite
horizon settings.
Keywords: Axiomatization; Exponential discounting; Quasi-
hyperbolic discounting; Anscombe-Aumann model.
JEL Classification: D90.
1 Introduction
The axiomatic foundation of intertemporal decisions is a fundamental ques-
tion in economics and generates considerable research interest. Despite the
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fact that a number of possible ways of discounting have appeared in the liter-
ature so far, two types have been predominantly used: exponential discount-
ing, first introduced by Samuelson (1937), and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
(Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997). The important question to be
answered is which axioms allow us to say that the preferences of a decision
maker can be represented using the discounted utility model with exponential
or quasi-hyperbolic discount functions? Existing axiom systems for intertem-
poral decisions address this question. These systems can be roughly divided
into two main groups: those with preferences over deterministic consumption
streams and those with preferences over stochastic consumption streams.
The first group has been the leading approach in the area, both for ex-
ponential and quasi-hyperbolic functions. In this framework a consumption
set is endowed with topological structure, and Debreu’s (1960) theorem on
additive representation is a key mathematical tool.
Koopmans’ result for exponential discounting with deterministic con-
sumption streams (Koopmans, 1960, 1972; Koopmans et al., 1964) remains
the most well-known. A revised formulation of Koopmans’ result was pro-
posed by Bleichrodt et al. (2008), using alternative conditions on preferences.
A similar approach was also suggested by Harvey (1986). The axiomatic
foundation of exponential discounting for the special case of a single dated
outcome was presented by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982).
In a non-stochastic framework quasi-hyperbolic discounting, to our knowl-
edge, has only been axiomatized by Olea and Strzalecki (2014). Building
on Bleichrodt et al. (2008) they provide three alternative sets of axioms.
Olea and Strzalecki’s axiomatization will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 6.
All the axiomatization systems mentioned above are formulated for infi-
nite consumption streams. The finite horizon case has rarely been discussed.
For exponential discounting, however, it can be found in Fishburn (1970).
The second group of axiomatic systems considers stochastic consumption
streams. To obtain an additive form the fundamental representation theorem
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) (1947) is used. The application
of this approach to exponential discounting was given by Epstein (1983).
A consumption stream is considered to be an outcome of a lottery. The
axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting by Hayashi (2003) builds on
Epstein’s (1983) axiom system. Both Hayashi and Epstein axiomatize pref-
erences over infinite stochastic consumption streams.
In this paper we work with preferences over streams of consumption lot-
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teries, i.e., a setting in which there is a lottery in each period of time. In
other words, we restrict Epstein and Hayashi’s framework to product mea-
sures. This framework allows us to apply Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963)
result from Subjective Expected Utility Theory. The main advantage of this
method is that it gives an opportunity to construct the discussed functional
forms of discounting in a simpler way. Importantly, the present work estab-
lishes a unified treatment of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in
both finite and infinite settings. With Fishburn (1982) and Harvey (1986)
as the key sources of technical inspiration, our approach requires relatively
simple axioms and facilitates proofs that are relatively straightforward.
2 Preliminaries
Assume that the objectives of a decision-maker can be expressed by a pref-
erence order < on the set of alternatives Xn, where n may be ∞. Think of
these alternatives as dated streams, for time periods t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}1. We
say that a utility function U : Xn → R represents this preference order, if
for all x,y ∈ Xn, x < y if and only if U(x) ≥ U(y).
We assume that X is a mixture set. That is, for every x, y ∈ X and
every λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists xλy ∈ X satisfying:
• x1y = x,
• xλy = y(1− λ)x,
• (xµy)λy = x(λµ)y.
Since X is a mixture set, the set Xn is easily seen to be a mixture set under
the following mixture operation: xλy = (x1λy1, . . . , xnλyn), where x,y ∈ X
n
and λ ∈ [0, 1].
The utility function u : X → R is called mixture linear (or just linear,
where no confusion is likely to arise) if for every x, y ∈ X we have u(xλy) =
λu(x) + (1− λ)u(y) for every λ ∈ [0, 1].
1It should also be mentioned that our setting considers a discrete time space. A
continuous-time framework can be found, for example, in the above-mentioned paper
by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) and in a generalized model of hyperbolic discounting
introduced by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Harvey (1986) analyzes discrete sequences
of timed outcomes with a continuous time space.
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The binary relation < on Xn induces a binary relation (also denoted <)
on X in the usual way: for any x, y ∈ X the preference x < y holds if and
only if (x, x, . . . , x) < (y, y, . . . , y).
The function U is called a discounted utility function if
U(x) =
n∑
t=1
D(t)u(xt),
for some non-constant u : X → R and some D : N → R with D(1) = 1.
The function D is called the discount function. If u is linear (and non-
constant), then the function U is called a discounted expected utility
function.
There are two types of discount functions which are commonly used in
modeling of time preferences:
• Exponential discounting: D(t) = δt−1, where δ ∈ (0, 1).
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting:
D(t) =
{
1 if t = 1,
βδt−1 if t ≥ 2.
for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1].
The important characteristic of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is that it
exhibits present bias. Present bias means that delaying two consumption
streams from present (t = 1) to the immediate future (t = 2) can change the
preferences of a decision-maker between these consumption streams.
The results of the recent experiments by Chark et al. (2015) show that
decision-makers are decreasingly impatient within the near future, however
they discount the remote future at a constant rate. In other words, present
bias may extend over the present moment (t = 1) to the near future t > 2,
with a constant discount factor from some period T . This gives a further gen-
eralization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which we call semi-hyperbolic
discounting:
D(t) =


1 if t = 1,
t−1∏
i=1
βiδ if 1 < t ≤ T,
δt−T
T−1∏
i=1
βiδ if t > T.
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We use SH(T ) to denote this discount function (for given δ, β1, . . . , βT−1).
This form of discounting was previously applied to model the time preferences
of a decision-maker in a consumption-savings problem (Young, 2007). Our
SH(T ) specification is not quite the same as the notion of semi-hyperbolic
discounting used in Olea and Strzalecki (2014). They apply the term to any
discount function which satisfies D(t) = δt−TD(T ) for all t > T (for some
T ). This class includes SH(T ), but is wider. The possibility of generalizing
quasi-hyperbolic discounting was earlier suggested by Hayashi (2003). The
form of the discount function he proposed is:
D(t) =


1 if t = 1,
t−1∏
i=1
β ′i if 1 < t ≤ T,
δt−T
T−1∏
i=1
β ′i if t > T.
By substituting δβt = β
′
t for all t ≤ T − 1 it is not difficult to see that semi-
hyperbolic discounting SH(T ) coincides with the form suggested by Hayashi
(2003). It is worth mentioning that he does not provide an axiomatization
of this form of discounting, pointing out that this case is somewhat com-
plicated. In our framework, however, the axiomatization of semi-hyperbolic
discounting can be obtained as a relatively straightforward extension of the
axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
The evidence of Chark et al. (2015) on extended present bias suggests the
following restrictions on the coefficients in SH(T ): β1 < β2 < . . . < βT−1.
In our version of SH(T ) we will impose the weaker requirements β1 ≤ β2 ≤
. . . ≤ βT−1, and βt ∈ (0, 1] for all t ≤ T − 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Imposing
these restrictions gives some advantages, as it can be immediately seen that
exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting are the special cases of semi-
hyperbolic discounting: SH(1) is the exponential discount function, whereas
SH(2) is the quasi-hyperbolic discount function.
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3 AA representations
We say that the preference order < on Xn has anAnscombe and Aumann
(AA) representation, if for every x,y ∈ Xn:
x < y if and only if
n∑
t=1
wtu(xt) ≥
n∑
t=1
wtu(yt),
where u : X → R is non-constant and linear and wt ≥ 0 for each t with at least
one wt > 0. We also say that the pair (u,w) provides an AA representation
for <.
A pre-condition for obtaining discounting in an exponential or quasi-
hyperbolic form is additive separability. In the framework of preferences
over streams of lotteries, Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) theorem provides
axioms which give an additively separable representation when n < ∞.
Anscombe and Aumann formulated their result for acts rather than tem-
poral streams. Here, states of the world are replaced by time periods.
3.1 Finite case (n <∞)
For n < ∞ the following axioms are necessary and sufficient for an AA
representation:
Axiom F1. (Weak order). < is a weak order on Xn.
Axiom F2. (Non-triviality). There exist some a, b ∈ X such that
(a, a, . . . , a) ≻ (b, b, . . . , b).
Axiom F3. (Mixture independence). x < y if and only if xλz < yλz for
every λ ∈ (0, 1) and every x,y, z ∈ Xn.
Axiom F4. (Mixture continuity). For every x,y, z ∈ Xn the sets
{α : xαz < y} and {β : y < xβz} are closed subsets of the unit in-
terval.
Axiom F5. (Monotonicity). For every x,y ∈ Xn if xt < yt for every t then
x < y.
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Theorem 1 (AA). The preferences < on Xn satisfy axioms F1-F5 if and
only if there exists an AA representation for < on Xn. If (u,w) and (u′,w′)
both provide AA representations for < on Xn, then u = Au′ + B for some
A > 0 and some B, and w = Cw′ for some C > 0.
The proof of the theorem for the general mixture set environment can
easily be constructed by combining the arguments in Fishburn (1982) and
Ryan (2009). Evidently, the key axiom here is the condition of mixture
independence. It is a strong axiom which imposes an additive structure.
3.2 Infinite case (n =∞)
Anscombe and Aumann’s result may be extended to the infinite horizon
case. One possible extension is given by Fishburn (1982). However, we give
a slightly modified version which incorporates ideas from Harvey (1986).
Fix some x0 ∈ X . We refer to the same x0 throughout the rest of the
paper. A consumption stream x is called ultimately constant if there exists
T such that x = (x1, . . . , xT , x0, x0, . . .). Note that there is a difference from
the usage of this definition in Bleichrodt et al. (2008) and Olea and Strzalecki
(2014), where x0 can be arbitrary. Let XT be the set of ultimately constant
consumption streams of length T . Denote the union of the sets XT over all
T as X∗. Let X∗∗ be the union of X∗ and all constant streams. It is not
hard to see that both X∗, X∗∗ ⊂ X∞ are mixture sets.
We must mention that the fixed x0 serves two purposes: firstly, it will be
needed to state the convergence axiom; and secondly, it allows us to define
the class X∗ of ultimately constant streams in a way that makes them a strict
subset of the usually defined class. Since some of the axioms only restrict
preferences over X∗∗ this second aspect confers some advantages.
Axiom I1. (Weak order). < is a weak order on X∞.
Axiom I2. (Non-triviality). There exist some a, b ∈ X such that
a ≻ x0 ≻ b.
Axiom I2 implies that x0 is an interior point with respect to preference. It
restricts both < and the choice of the fixed element x0.
Axiom I3. (Mixture independence). x < y if and only if xλz < yλz for
every λ ∈ (0, 1) and every x,y, z ∈ X∗∗.
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Axiom I4. (Mixture continuity). For every x, z ∈ X∗∗ and every y ∈ X∞
the sets {α : xαz < y} and {β : y < xβz} are closed subsets of the unit
interval.
Axiom I5. (Monotonicity). For every x,y ∈ X∞: if xt < yt for every t then
x < y.
We have applied a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom in comparison
with the interperiod monotonicity used by Fishburn. However, Axiom I5 is
sufficient to obtain an AA representation.
For the statement of the next axiom we need to introduce some notation.
Let [a]k = (x0, . . . , x0, a, x0, . . .) where a ∈ X is in the k
th position. Using
this notation, we state the following axiom:
Axiom I6. (Convergence). For every x = (x1, x2, . . .) ∈ X
∞, every x+, x− ∈
X and every k:
• if [x+]k ≻ [xk]k there exists T
+ ≥ k such that
x 4 x+k,T for all T ≥ T
+,
where x+k,T = (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, x
+, xk+1, . . . , xT , x0, x0, . . .);
• if [x−]k ≺ [xk]k there exists T
− ≥ k such that
x < x−k,T for all T ≥ T
−,
where x−k,T = (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, x
−, xk+1, . . . , xT , x0, x0, . . .).
Our convergence axiom differs from Axiom B6, that was used by Fishburn:
Axiom B6. For some xˆ ∈ X , every x,y ∈ X∞ and every λ ∈ (0, 1):
• if x ≻ y, then there exists T such that (x1, . . . , xn, xˆ, xˆ, . . .) < xλy
for all n ≥ T ;
• if x ≺ y, then there exists T such that (x1, . . . , xn, xˆ, xˆ, . . .) 4 xλy
for all n ≥ T .
Instead, Axiom I6 adapts ideas from Harvey (1986)2. Axiom I6 is more ap-
pealing for our purposes as it not only guarantees the convergence of the AA
2It is worth mentioning that Fishburn’s motivation for the convergence axiom B6 looks
somewhat contrived in the context of acts (Fishburn, 1982, p. 113). However, it becomes
very natural in the context where states of the world are re-interpreted as periods of time.
8
representation, but also allows us to relax two axioms, mixture independence
and mixture continuity, which are no longer required to hold on all of X∞.
We thus obtain the following representation:
Theorem 2 (Infinite AA). The preferences < on X∞ satisfy axioms I1-I6
if and only if there exists an AA representation for < on X∞. If (u,w) and
(u′,w′) both provide AA representations for < on X∞ , then u = Au′ + B
for some A > 0 and some B, and w = Cw′ for some C > 0.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix. It combines elements
of the arguments in Fishburn (1982), Harvey (1986) and Ryan (2009).
4 Discounted utility: finite case (n <∞)
4.1 Exponential discounting
Recall that a preference < on Xn is represented by an exponentially dis-
counted utility function if there exists a non-constant function u : X → R
and a parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
U(x) =
n∑
t=1
δt−1u(xt).
If u is linear (and non-constant), then we say that the pair (u, δ) provides an
exponentially discounted expected utility representation.
Based on Theorem 1 it is easy to obtain such a representation. In order to
do so an adjustment of non-triviality and two additional axioms - impatience
and stationarity - are required.
Axiom F2′. (Essentiality of period 1). There exist some a, b ∈ X and some
x ∈ Xn such that (a, x2, . . . , xn) ≻ (b, x2, . . . , xn).
Axiom F6. (Impatience). For all a, b ∈ X if a ≻ b, then for all x ∈ Xn
(a, b, x3, . . . , xn) ≻ (b, a, x3, . . . , xn).
Axiom F7. (Stationarity). The preference (a, x2, . . . , xn) < (a, y2, . . . , yn)
holds if and only if (x2, . . . , xn, a) < (y2, . . . , yn, a) for every a ∈ X and
every x,y ∈ Xn.
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It is not hard to see that essentiality of each period t follows from the
essentiality of period 1 and the stationarity axiom.
Now the following result can be stated:
Theorem 3 (Exponential discounting). The preferences < on Xn satisfy
axioms F1, F2′, F3-F7 if and only if there exists an exponentially discounted
expected utility representation for < on Xn. If (u, δ) and (u′, δ′) both provide
exponentially discounted expected utility representations for < on Xn, then
u = Au′ +B for some A > 0 and some B, and δ = δ′.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the axioms are implied by the rep-
resentation. Conversely, suppose the axioms hold. Note that non-triviality
follows from essentiality of period 1 and monotonicity.
By Theorem 1 we therefore know that < has an AA representation (u,w).
Define <′ on Xn−1 as follows:
(x1, . . . , xn−1) <
′ (y1, . . . , yn−1)⇔ (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) < (x0, y1, . . . , yn−1).
Then <′ is represented by:
U ′(x) = w2u(x1) + . . .+ wnu(xn−1).
Next, define <′′ on Xn−1 as follows:
(x1, . . . , xn−1) <
′′ (y1, . . . , yn−1)⇔ (x1, . . . , xn−1, x0) < (y1, . . . , yn−1, x0).
Then <′′ is represented by:
U ′′(x) = w1u(x1) + . . .+ wn−1u(xn−1).
According to stationarity, these preferences are equivalent (<′≡<′′) with two
different AA representations (U ′ and U ′′). Preference orders <′≡<′′ satisfy
the AA axioms on Xn−1. Recall that wt are unique up to a scale. Hence,
wt+1 = δwt for some δ > 0 and it follows that
wn = δwn−1 = δ
2wn−2 = . . . = δ
n−twt = . . . = δ
n−1w1.
Since all periods are essential it is without loss of generality to set w1 = 1.
Then we obtain the following representation for < on Xn:
U(x) =
n∑
t=1
δt−1u(xt), where δ > 0.
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Since impatience holds: if a ≻ b, then
(a, b, x3, . . . , xn) ≻ (b, a, x3, . . . , xn).
From the representation it follows that:
u(a) + δu(b) > u(b) + δu(a),
or, equivalently,
(1− δ)(u(a)− u(b)) > 0.
As u(a) > u(b) , it is possible to conclude that δ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose that (u, δ) and (u′, δ′) both provide exponentially discounted
expected utility representations for < on Xn. Since (u, δ) and (u′, δ′) both
provide AA representations for < it follows that u = Au′+B for some A > 0
and some B, and there is some C > 0 such that δt−1 = C(δ′)t−1 for all t.
Taking t = 1 we obtain C = 1, and hence δ = δ′.
4.2 Semi-hyperbolic discounting
A preference < on Xn has a SH(T ) discounted utility representation if there
exists a non-constant function u : X → R and parameters β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . . ≤
βT−1, and βt ∈ (0, 1] for all t ≤ T − 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following
function represents <:
U(x) = u(x1) + β1δu(x2) + β1β2δ
2u(x3) + . . .+ β1β2 · · ·βT−2δ
T−2u(xT−1)
+β1β2 · · ·βT−1
n∑
t=T
δt−1u(xt).
If u is linear (and non-constant), then the function U is called a SH(T )
discounted expected utility representation. In this case, we say that
(u,β, δ) provides a SH(T ) discounted expected utility representation, where
β = (β1, β2, . . . , βT−1).
To obtain this form of discounting a number of modifications to the set
of axioms is required. A stronger essentiality condition should be used:
Axiom F2′′. (Essentiality of periods 1, . . . , T ). There exist some a, b ∈ X
and some x ∈ Xn such that for every t = 1, . . . , T :
(x1, x2, . . . , xt−1, a, xt+1, . . . , xn) ≻ (x1, x2, . . . , xt−1, b, xt+1, . . . , xn).
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The impatience axiom, which is used to guarantee δ ∈ (0, 1), should be
restated for the periods T and T + 1:
Axiom F6′. (Impatience). For every a, b ∈ X if a ≻ b, then for every
x ∈ Xn:
(x1, . . . , xT−1, a, b, xT+2, . . . , xn) ≻ (x1, . . . , xT−1, b, a, xT+2, . . . , xn).
The generalization requires relaxing the axiom of stationarity to stationarity
from period T .
Axiom F7′. (Stationarity from period T). The preference
(x1, . . . , xT−1, a, xT+1, . . . , xn) < (x1, . . . , xT−1, a, yT+1, . . . , yn)
holds if and only if
(x1, . . . , xT−1, xT+1, . . . , xn, a) < (x1, . . . , xT−1, yT+1, . . . , yn, a)
for every a ∈ X and every x ∈ Xn.
The addition of the early bias axiom is needed, so that present bias may arise
between any periods {t, t+ 1}, where t ≤ T .
Axiom F8. (Early bias) For every a, b, c, d ∈ X such that a ≻ c, b ≺ d, for
all x ∈ Xn and every t ≤ T if
(x1, . . . , xt−1, a, b, xt+2, . . . , xn) ∼ (x1, . . . , xt−1, c, d, xt+2, . . . , xn), then
(x1, . . . , xt−2, a, b, xt+2, . . . , xn, xt−1) < (x1, . . . , xt−2, c, d, xt+2, . . . , xn, xt−1).
The early bias axiom is also referred to as the extended present bias
axiom.
Theorem 4 (Semi-hyperbolic discounting). The preferences < on Xn sat-
isfy axioms F1, F2′′, F3, F4, F5, F6′, F7′, F8 if and only if there exists a
SH(T ) discounted expected utility representation for < on Xn. If (u,β, δ)
and (u′,β′, δ′) both provide SH(T ) discounted expected utility representations
for < on Xn, then u = Au′ + B for some A > 0 and some B, and δ = δ′,
β = β′.
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Proof. It can be easily seen that the axioms are implied by the representation.
Suppose that the axioms hold. As for Theorem 3, the conditions of AA
representation are satisfied, so it follows that < has an AA representation
(w, u). Define <′ on Xn−T as follows:
(x1, . . . , xn−T ) <
′ (y1, . . . , yn−T )⇔
(x0, . . . , x0, x1, . . . , xn−T ) < (x0, . . . , x0, y1, . . . , yn−T ).
Then <′ is represented by:
U ′(x) = wT+1u(x1) + . . .+ wnu(xn−T ).
Next, define <′′ on Xn−T as follows:
(x1, . . . , xn−T ) <
′′ (y1, . . . , yn−T )⇔
(x0, . . . , x0, x1, . . . , xn−T , x0) < (x0, . . . , x0, y1, . . . , yn−T , x0).
Then <′′ is represented by:
U ′′(x) = wTu(x1) + . . .+ wn−1u(xn−T ).
According to stationarity from period T , the preferences are equivalent
(<′≡<′′) with two different AA representations (U ′ and U ′′).
Preference orders <′≡<′′ satisfy the AA axioms on Xn−T . Recall that wt
are unique up to a scale. Hence, as essentiality holds for all t (which follows
from Axiom F2′ and Axiom F7′), we have wt+1 = δwt for some δ > 0 and
hence
wn = δwn−1 = δ
2wn−2 = . . . = δ
n−twt = . . . = δ
n−TwT .
Therefore, wt = δ
t−TwT for all t ≥ T + 1. We therefore obtain the following
representation for <:
U(x) = w1u(x1) + . . .+ wT−1u(xT−1) + wT
n∑
t=T
δt−Tu(xt).
Because of the essentiality of the first period and uniqueness of u up to affine
transformations:
Uˆ(x) = u(x1) +
w2
w1
u(x2) + . . .+
wT−1
w1
u(xT−1) +
wT
w1
n∑
t=T
δt−Tu(xt).
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Note that
w3
w1
=
w3
w2
·
w2
w1
,
· · · ,
wT
w1
=
wT
wT−1
·
wT−1
wT−2
· . . . ·
w2
w1
.
Let γt−1 =
wt
wt−1
for all t ≤ T . Therefore,
w2
w1
= γ1,
w3
w1
= γ1γ2,
· · · ,
wT
w1
= γ1γ2 . . . γT−1.
With this notation:
Uˆ(x) = u(x1)+ γ1u(x2)+ . . .+ γ1 · · ·γT−2u(xT−1)+ γ1 · · · γT−1
n∑
t=T
δt−Tu(xt).
It is necessary to show that γt−1 = βt−1δ with βt−1 ∈ (0, 1] for all t ≤ T .
Suppose that t = T . Choose a, b, c, d ∈ X such that u(b) < u(d),
u(a) > u(c) and
γ1 · · · γT−1u(a) + γ1 · · · γT−1δu(b) = γ1 · · · γT−1u(c) + γ1 · · · γT−1δu(d). (1)
Since essentiality is satisfied for each period we can rearrange the equation
(1):
δ =
u(a)− u(c)
u(d)− u(b)
. (2)
From (1) it also follows that
(x1, . . . , xT−1, a, b, xT+2, . . . , xn) ∼ (x1, . . . , xT−1, c, d, xT+2, . . . , xn),
Therefore, by the early bias axiom:
(x1, . . . , xT−2, a, b, xT+2, . . . , xn, xT−1) < (x1, . . . , xT−2, c, d, xT+2, . . . , xn, xT−1).
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Thus we obtain:
γ1 · · · γT−2u(a) + γ1 · · · γT−1u(b) ≥ γ1 · · · γT−2u(c) + γ1 · · · γT−1u(d).
Since the essentiality condition is satisfied for each period we can rearrange
this inequality:
γT−1 ≤
u(a)− u(c)
u(d)− u(b)
. (3)
Comparing (2) to (3) we conclude that δ ≥ γT−1, therefore, γT−1 = βT−1δ,
where βT−1 ∈ (0, 1].
Analogously, suppose that t = T − 1. Choose a′, b′, c′, d′ ∈ X such that
u(b′) < u(d′) and u(a′) > u(c′). Using present bias axiom and essentiality of
each period we obtain
γT−1 =
u(a′)− u(c′)
u(d′)− u(b′)
, (4)
and
γT−2 ≤
u(a′)− u(c′)
u(d′)− u(b′)
. (5)
It follows from (4) and (5) that γT−2 ≤ γT−1. Therefore, γT−2 = β
′
T−2γT−1,
where β ′T−2 ∈ (0, 1]. Recall that γT−1 = βT−1δ. Hence,
γT−2 = β
′
T−2βT−1δ = βT−2δ,
where βT−2 = β
′
T−2βT−1 and βT−2 ∈ (0, 1] as both β
′
T−2 ∈ (0, 1] and βT−1 ∈
(0, 1]. Note also that βT−2 ≤ βT−1.
Using the early bias axiom repeatedly for t < T−1 we obtain γt−1 = βt−1δ
with βt−1 ∈ (0, 1] for all t ≤ T and β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . . ≤ βT−1. Hence,
Uˆ(x) = u(x1) + β1δu(x2) + β1β2δ
2u(x3) + . . .+ β1β2 · · ·βT−2δ
T−2u(xT−1)
+β1β2 · · ·βT−1
n∑
t=T
δt−1u(xt).
To show that δ ∈ (0, 1) the impatience axiom should be applied. For
every a, b ∈ X if a ≻ b, then for every x ∈ Xn
(x1, . . . , xT−1, a, b, xT+2, . . . , xn) ≻ (x1, . . . , xT−1, b, a, xT+2, . . . , xn).
Then
β1 · · ·βT−1δ
T−1u(a)+β1 · · ·βT−1δ
Tu(b) > β1 · · ·βT−1δ
T−1u(b)+β1 · · ·βT−1δ
Tu(a).
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Therefore, due to essentiality of each period:
(1− δ)(u(a)− u(b)) > 0.
Hence, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose that (u,β, δ) and (u′,β′, δ′) both provide SH(T ) discounted ex-
pected utility representations for < on Xn. Let D(t) and D′(t) be semi-
hyperbolic discount functions for given β, δ and β′, δ′, respectively. Since
(u,β, δ) and (u′,β′, δ′) both provide AA representations for < it follows that
u = Au′+B for some A > 0 and some B, and there is some C > 0 such that
D(t) = C ·D′(t) for all t. Taking t = 1 we obtain C = 1, and hence, letting
t = 2, 3, . . . , T we get βtδ = β
′
tδ
′ for all t ≤ T . Finally, letting t = T + 1 we
conclude that δ = δ′. Therefore, β = β′.
5 Discounted utility: infinite case (n =∞)
5.1 Exponential discounting
Based on the AA representation for the preferences over infinite consumption
streams (Theorem 2), with some strengthening of non-triviality (Axiom I2)
and the addition of a suitable stationarity axiom, discounting functions in
an exponential form can be obtained. The impatience axiom is not needed
since convergence (Axiom I6) plays its role.
Axiom I2′. (Essentiality of period 1). There exist some a, b ∈ X such that
[a]1 ≻ x0 ≻ [b]1.
Axiom I7. (Stationarity). The preference (a, x1, x2, . . .) < (a, y1, y2, . . .)
holds if and only if (x1, x2, . . .) < (y1, y2, . . .) for every a ∈ X and
every x,y ∈ X∞.
Theorem 5 (Exponential discounting). The preferences < on X∞ satisfy
axioms I1, I2′, I3-I7 if and only if there exists an exponentially discounted
expected utility representation for < on X∞. If (u, δ) and (u′, δ′) both provide
exponentially discounted expected utility representations for < on X∞, then
u = Au′ +B for some A > 0 and some B, and δ = δ′.
Proof. The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. The proof of suffi-
ciency follows the steps of the proof of Theorem 3 with n = ∞. Applying
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Theorem 2 to the preferences satisfying the stationarity axiom we obtain the
representation:
U(x) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u(xt),
where δ > 0 and x ∈ X∞.
Next, instead of using the impatience axiom as it is done in the finite case,
the convergence axiom is applied. Take a constant stream a = (a, a, . . .), such
that u(a) 6= 0. Then,
U(a) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u(a) = u(a)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1,
We know that U(a) should converge by Theorem 2. It follows that δ < 1.
The proof of the uniqueness claims is analogous to Theorem 3.
5.2 Semi-hyperbolic discounting
The extension of semi-hyperbolic discounting to the case where n = ∞ is
easily obtained.
Axiom I2′′. (Essentiality of periods 1, . . . , T ). For some a, b ∈ X we have
[a]t ≻ x0 ≻ [b]t for every t = 1, . . . , T .
The generalization requires relaxing the axiom of stationarity to stationarity
from period T .
Axiom I7′. (Stationarity from period T). The preference
(x1, . . . , xT−1, a, xT+1, . . .) < (x1, . . . , xT−1, a, yT+1, . . .)
holds if and only if
(x1, . . . , xT−1, xT+1, . . .) < (x1, . . . , xT−1, yT+1, . . .)
for every a ∈ X , and every x ∈ X∞.
As in the finite case the addition of the early bias axiom allows present bias
between {t, t + 1}, where t ≤ T .
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Axiom I8. (Early bias) For every a, b, c, d ∈ X such that a ≻ c, b ≺ d, and
for all x ∈ X∞ and every t ≤ T
if (x1, . . . , xt−1, a, b, xt+2, . . .) ∼ (x1, . . . , xt−1, c, d, xt+2, . . .), then
(x1, . . . , xt−2, a, b, xt+2, . . .) < (x1, . . . , xt−2, c, d, xt+2, . . .).
Theorem 6 (Semi-hyperbolic discounting). The preferences < on X∞ sat-
isfy axioms I1, I2′′, I3-I6, I7′, I8 if and only if there exists a SH(T ) dis-
counted expected utility representation for < onXn. If (u,β, δ) and (u′,β′, δ′)
both provide SH(T ) discounted expected utility representations for < on Xn,
then u = Au′ +B for some A > 0 and some B, and δ = δ′, β = β′.
Proof. The necessity of the axioms is obviously implied by the representation.
The proof of sufficiency is analogous to the finite case. Applying Theorem 2
and stationarity from period T we get the representation:
U(x) = w1u(x1) + . . .+ wT−1u(xT−1) + wT
∞∑
t=T
δt−Tu(xt).
Next, dividing by w1 > 0 and introducing the notation
wt
wt−1
= γt−1 > 0,
where t ≤ T , the representation becomes
Uˆ(x) = u(x1)+ γ1u(x2)+ . . .+ γ1 · · ·γT−2u(xT−1)+ γ1 · · · γT−1
∞∑
t=T
δt−Tu(xt).
Using essentilaity of each period and the early bias axiom repeatedly,
we demonstrate that γt−1 = βt−1δ with βt−1 ∈ (0, 1] for all t ≤ T and
β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . . ≤ βT−1. Therefore,
Uˆ(x) = u(x1) + β1δu(x2) + β1β2δ
2u(x3) + . . .+ β1β2 · · ·βT−2δ
T−2u(xT−1)
+β1β2 · · ·βT−1
∞∑
t=T
δt−1u(xt).
Finally, to show that δ ∈ (0, 1), take a constant stream a = (a, a, . . .),
such that u(a) 6= 0. Then,
Uˆ(a) =u(a) + β1δu(a) + . . .+ β1 · · ·βT−2δ
T−2u(a) + β1 · · ·βT−1
∞∑
t=T
δt−1u(a)
=u(a)
(
1 + β1δ + . . .+ β1 · · ·βT−2δ
T−2 + β1 · · ·βT−1
∞∑
t=T
δt−1
)
.
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From Theorem 2 it follows that Uˆ(a) converges, therefore, δ < 1.
The proof of the uniqueness claims is analogous to Theorem 4.
6 Discussion
A number of axiomatizations of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
have been suggested by different authors. In fact, all the axiomatizations use
different assumptions and there is no straightforward transformation from
one type of discounting to another. In this paper we provided an alter-
native approach to get a time separable discounted utility representation,
showing that Anscombe and Aumann’s result can be exploited as a common
background for axiomatizing exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
in both finite and infinite time horizons. In addition, we demonstrated that
the axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting can be easily extended to
SH(T ).
A key distinguishing feature of our set-up is the mixture set structure for
X and the use of the mixture independence condition. An essential question,
however, is whether mixture independence is normatively compelling in a
time preference context, because states are mutually exclusive whereas time
periods are not. It is worth mentioning that the temporal interpretation of
the AA framework was also used by Wakai (2008) to axiomatize an entirely
different class of preferences, which exhibit a desire to spread bad and good
outcomes evenly over time.
Commonly, the condition of joint independence is used to establish ad-
ditive separability in time-preference models. Given A ⊆ T , where T =
{1, . . . , n}, and x,y ∈ Xn, define xAy as follows: (xAy)t is xt if t ∈ A and yt
otherwise. The preference order < satisfies joint independence if for every
A ⊆ T and for every x,x′,y,y′ ∈ Xn:
xAy < x
′
Ay if and only if xAy
′
< x′Ay
′.
Joint independence is used to obtain an additively separable representa-
tion by Debreu (1960), so we will sometimes refer it as a Debreu-type in-
dependence condition. It is known that mixture independence implies joint
independence (Grant and Van Zandt, 2009), but whether joint independence
(with some other plausible conditions) implies mixture independence is yet
to be determined.
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In fact, we are not the first to use a mixture-type independence condition
in the context of time preferences. Wakai (2008) also does so, though he uses
the weaker form of constant independence introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989).
A version of the mixture independence condition can also be formulated
in a Savage environment (Savage, 1954) without objective probabilities, as
discussed in Gul (1992). Olea and Strzalecki (2014) use precisely this version
of mixture independence in one of their axiomatizations of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. For every x, y ∈ X let us write (x, y) for (x, y, y, . . .) ∈ X∞.
Let m(x1, y1) denote some c ∈ X satisfying (x1, y1) ∼ (c, c). For any streams
(x1, x2) and (z1, z2) the consumption stream (m(x1, z1), m(x2, z2)) is called
a subjective mixture of (x1, x2) and (z1, z2). Olea and Strzalecki’s version
of the mixture independence axiom (their Axiom I2) is as follows: for every
x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈ X if (x1, x2) < (y1, y2), then
(m(x1, z1), m(x2, z2)) < (m(y1, z1), m(y2, z2))
and
(m(z1, x1), m(z2, x2)) < (m(z1, y1), m(z2, y2)).
In other words, if a consumption stream (x1, x2) is preferred to a stream
(y1, y2), then subjectively mixing each stream with (z1, z2) does not affect
the preference.
In their axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting Olea and Strza-
lecki invoke their mixture independence condition (Axiom 12) as well as
Debreu-type independence conditions. The latter are used to obtain a rep-
resentation in the form
x < y if and only if u(x1) +
∞∑
t=2
δt−1v(xt) ≥ u(y1) +
∞∑
t=2
δt−1v(yt),
then their Axiom 12 is used to ensure v = βu.3
Hayashi (2003) and Epstein (1983) considered preferences over lotteries
over consumption streams. In their frameworkX∞ is the set of non-stochastic
3As pointed out above, mixture independence stated for n periods implies joint inde-
pendence for n periods. Hence, this raises the obvious question of whether it is possible
to use an n-period version of the subjective mixture independence axiom to obtain a time
separable discounted utility representation without the need for the Debreu-type indepen-
dence conditions.
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consumption streams, where X is required to be a compact connected separa-
ble metric space. Denote the set of probability measures on Borel σ-algebra
defined on X∞ as ∆(X∞). It is useful to note that our setting is the re-
striction of the Hayashi and Epstein set-up to product measures, i.e., to
∆(X)∞ ⊂ ∆(X∞). The axiomatization systems by Hayashi and Epstein are
based on the assumptions of expected utility theory. The existence of a con-
tinuous and bounded vNM utility index U : ∆(X∞)→ R is stated as one of
the axioms. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for this is provided
by Grandmont (1972), and includes the usual vNM independence condition
on ∆(X∞): for every x,y, z ∈ ∆(X∞) and any α ∈ [0, 1], x ∼ y implies
αx+ (1− α)z ∼ αy + (1− α)z.
Obviously, this independence condition is not strong enough to deliver
joint independence of time periods, which is why additional assumptions of
separability are needed. Two further Debreu-type independence conditions
are required for exponential discounting:
• independence of stochastic outcomes in periods {1, 2} from determin-
istic outcomes in {3, 4, . . .},
• independence of stochastic outcomes in periods {2, 3, . . .} from deter-
ministic outcomes in period {1}.
To obtain quasi-hyperbolic discounting two additional Debreu-type inde-
pendence conditions should be satisfied:
• independence of stochastic outcomes in periods {2, 3} from determin-
istic outcomes in periods {1} and {4, . . .},
• independence of stochastic outcomes in periods {3, 4, . . .} from deter-
ministic outcomes in periods {1, 2}.
It is easy to see that these axioms applied to the non-stochastic consump-
tion streams are analogous to the Debreu-type independence conditions used
in Bleichrodt et al. (2008) and Olea and Strzalecki (2014).
In summary, to get a discounted utility representation with the discount
function in either exponential and quasi-hyperbolic form separability must
be assumed. The mixture independence axiom appears to be a strong as-
sumption, however, it gives the desired separability without the need for
additional Debreu-type independence conditions.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Necessity of the axioms is straightforward to verify. Therefore we will
focus on the proof of sufficiency.
Step 1. Applying Theorem 1 of Fishburn (1982) to the mixture set X ,
it follows from Axioms I1, I3, I4 that there exists a linear utility function
u preserving the order on X (unique up to positive affine transformations).
Normalize u so that u(x0) = 0. Note that by non-triviality u(x0) is in the
interior of the non-degenerate interval u(X).
Convert streams into their utility vectors by replacing the outcomes in
each period by their utility values. Define the following order: (v1, v2, . . .) <
∗
(u1, u2, . . .) ⇔ there exist x,y ∈ X
∞ such that x < y and u(xt) = vt
and u(yt) = ut for every t. This order is unambiguously defined because
of the monotonicity assumption, i.e., if xi ∼ x
′
i then (x1, . . . , xi, . . .) ∼
(x1, . . . , x
′
i, . . .).
The preference order <∗ inherits the properties of weak order, mixture
independence and mixture continuity from <. Note that u(X)∞ is a mixture
set under the standard operation of taking convex combinations: if v,u ∈
u(X)∞ then
vλu = λv + (1− λ)u for every λ ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, by Theorem 1 of Fishburn (1982) we obtain a linear representation
U : u(X)∞ → R, where U is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Hence v <∗ u if and only if U(v) ≥ U(u).
Step 2. Normalize U so that U(0, 0, . . .) = U(0) = 0. Since 0 is in the
interior of u(X), and since U(vλ0) = λU(v) for any v ∈ R∞ and for every
λ ∈ (0, 1), we can assume that U is defined on R∞.
Mixture linearity of U implies standard linearity of U on R∞. To prove
this, we need to show that U(kv) = kU(v) for any k and U(v + u) =
U(v) + U(u) for any u,v ∈ R∞.
As u(X)∞ is a mixture set under the operation of taking convex combi-
nations, U(vk0) = U(kv+ (1− k)0) = U(kv) = kU(v) for any k ∈ (0, 1). If
k > 1 then U(v) = U(k
k
v) = 1
k
U(kv). Multiplying both parts of this equa-
tion by k, we obtain U(kv) = kU(v) for all k > 1. Therefore, U(kv) = kU(v)
for any k > 0.
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To prove that U(v + u) = U(v) + U(u), consider the mixture v 1
2
u. By
mixture linearity of U we have:
U(v
1
2
u) =
1
2
U(v) +
1
2
U(u) =
1
2
(U(v) + U(u)) . (6)
On the other hand, v 1
2
u = 1
2
v + 1
2
u = 1
2
(v + u). Therefore,
U(v
1
2
u) = U
(
1
2
(v + u)
)
=
1
2
U(v + u) (7)
Comparing (6) and (7) we conclude that U(v + u) = U(v) + U(u).
Finally, note that
U(0) = U (v + (−v)) = U(v) + U(−v) = 0,
hence U(−v) = −U(v). Therefore, if k < 0, then U(kv) = −kU(−v) =
kU(v).
For each T , consider the function f : RT → R defined as follows:
f(v1, . . . , vT ) = U(v1, . . . , vT , 0, 0, . . .).
This function is linear on RT and it satisfies f(0) = 0, therefore,
f(v1, . . . , vT ) =
T∑
t=1
wTt vt,
where wT = (wT1 , . . . , w
T
T ). By monotonicity w
T
t ≥ 0 for all t ≤ T .
Note that wTt = U([1]t), where [1]t is the vector with 1 in period t and 0
elsewhere. It follows that wTt = w
T ′
t for any T and T
′. Hence there is a vector
w ∈ R∞ such that U(v1, . . . , vT , 0, 0, . . .) =
∞∑
t=1
wtvt for any (v1, . . . , vT ) ∈
R
T .
Recalling that vt = u(xt) we obtain
U(u(x1), . . . , u(xT ), 0, 0, . . .) =
T∑
t=1
wtu(xt) for all x ∈ X
∗.
Therefore, for every x,y ∈ X∗ we have x < y if and only if
T∑
t=1
wtu(xt) ≥
T∑
t=1
wtu(yt).
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By slightly abusing the notation, re-define U so that:
U(x1, . . . , xT , x0, x0, . . .) =
T∑
t=1
wtu(xt) for all x ∈ X
∗.
Hence U(x) =
∞∑
t=1
wtu(xt) represents preferences on X
∗.
Step 3. Next, we show that U(x1, x2, . . .) converges for any (x1, x2, . . .).
Define UT : X
∞ → R as follows: UT (x) =
T∑
t=1
ut(xt), where ut(xt) = wtu(xt).
Consider the sequence of functions U1, U2, . . . , UT , . . . According to the
Cauchy Criterion, a sequence of functions UT (x) defined on X
∞ converges
on X∞ if and only if for any ε > 0 and any x ∈ X∞ there exists T ∈ N such
that |UN(x)− UM(x)| < ε for any N,M ≥ T .
Fix some x ∈ X∞ and ε > 0. Suppose that for some k it is possible
to choose x+, x− such that [x+]k ≻ [xk]k ≻ [x
−]k. By Step 2 the preference
[x+]k ≻ [xk]k ≻ [x
−]k implies that wk > 0. Therefore, as u is a continuous
function, it is without loss of generality to assume that
uk(x
+)− uk(xk) < ε/2 and uk(xk)− uk(x
−) < ε/2.
It follows that uk(x
+)− uk(x
−) < ε, or uk(x
−)− uk(x
+) > −ε. By Axiom I6
there exist T+ and T− satisfying k ≤ min{T−, T+} such that
x+k,N < x < x
−
k,M , for all N ≥ T
+, M ≥ T−.
Let T ∗ = max{T−, T+}. It is necessary to demonstrate that |UN(x) −
UM(x)| < ε for any N,M ≥ T
∗. If N = M the result is obviously true.
If N 6= M then it is without loss of generality to assume that N > M . By
the additive representation:
U(x+k,N) ≥ U(x
−
k,M).
Expanding
uk(x
+) +
N∑
t=1,t6=k
ut(xt) ≥ uk(x
−) +
M∑
t=1,t6=k
ut(xt).
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By rearranging this inequality
N∑
t=M+1
ut(xt) ≥ uk(x
−)− uk(x
+) > −ε.
As N > M ≥ T ∗ it is also true that U(x+k,M) ≥ U(x
−
k,N), hence
N∑
t=M+1
ut(xt) ≤ uk(x
+)− uk(x
−) < ε.
Note that
N∑
t=M+1
ut(xt) = UN(x)− UM(x).
Hence, |UN(x)−UM (x)| < ε and it follows that U(x) converges by the Cauchy
criterion.
Suppose now that it is not possible to find such k that
[x+]k ≻ [xk]k ≻ [x
−]k for some x
+, x− ∈ X . If wt = 0 for all t then the
result is trivial. Suppose that wt > 0 for some t. Then for every period t for
which wt > 0 we have
xt ∈ X
e ≡ {z ∈ X : z < z′ for all z′ ∈ X or z′ < z for all z′ ∈ X}.
For some λ ∈ (0, 1) replace xt with the mixture xtλx0 for each t. Call the
resulting stream x∗. Then
UT (x)−UT (x
∗) =
T∑
t=1
ut(xt)−
T∑
t=1
ut(xtλx0) = (1−λ)
T∑
t=1
ut(xt) = (1−λ)UT (x).
By rearranging this equation it follows that UT (x
∗) = λUT (x). By the pre-
vious argument UT (x
∗) converges, therefore, UT (x) converges.
Step 4. Show that U(x) represents the order on X∞. Suppose that x < y,
where x,y ∈ X∞. If for some k, j it is possible to find x+, y− such that
[x+]k ≻ [xk]k and [y
−]j ≺ [yj]j , then [x
+λxk]k ≻ [xk]k for every λ ∈ (0, 1)
and [y−µyj]j ≺ [yj]j for every µ ∈ (0, 1). Let x
∗ = x+λxk and y
∗ = y−µyj for
some λ, µ ∈ (0, 1). Denote
x∗k,N = (x1, . . . , xk−1, x
∗, xk+1, . . . , xN , x0, x0, . . .),
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and
y∗j,M = (y1, . . . , yj−1, y
∗, yj+1, . . . , yM , x0, x0, . . .).
Then by Axiom I6, there exist T−, T+ such that
x∗k,N < x < y < y
∗
j,M
for all N ≥ T+ and for all M ≥ T−. Since x∗k,N < y
∗
j,M and U represents <
on X∗ we have:
U(x∗k,N) ≥ U(y
∗
j,M).
By Step 3 we know that U(x1, . . . , xk−1, x
∗, xk+1 . . .) and
U(y1, . . . , yj−1, y
∗, yj+1, . . .) converge, so
U(x1, . . . , xk−1, x
∗, xk+1, . . .) ≥ U(y1, . . . , yj−1, y
∗, yj+1, . . .).
Recall that x∗ = x+λxk and y
∗ = y−µyj for some λ ∈ (0, 1) and some
µ ∈ (0, 1). Since λ and µ are arbitrary, it follows that U(x) ≥ U(y).
If it is not possible to find x+, y− such that [x+]k ≻ [xk]k and [y
−]j ≺ [yj]j ,
then either wt = 0 for all t, in which case U(x) = U(y); or xt < z
′ for all
z′ ∈ X and all t with wt > 0, in which case U(x) ≥ U(y); or z
′ < yt for all
z′ ∈ X and all t with wt > 0 in which case U(x) ≥ U(y).
It is worth noting that as x < y implies U(x) ≥ U(y), then, by Axiom I2
it follows that wt > 0 for at least one t. Therefore,
∑∞
t=1wt > 0. Normalizing
by 1/
∑∞
t=1wt, we can assume that
∑∞
t=1wt = 1.
Next, assume that U(x) ≥ U(y). Suppose that it is possible to find k and
x+, x− ∈ X such that x+k,N < x < x
−
k,N for some fixed N . By mixture con-
tinuity, the set {α : x+k,Nαx
−
k,N < x} is closed. By assumption x
+
k,N < x,
so it follows that α = 1 is included into the set. Analogously, the set
{β : x < x+k,Nβx
−
k,N} is closed. In fact, β = 0 belongs to the set, as x < x
−
k,N .
Therefore, as both sets are closed, nonempty and form the unit interval, their
intersection is nonempty. Hence, there exists λ such that x ∼ x+k,Nλx
−
k,N .
Note that x+k,Nλx
−
k,N = (x1, . . . , xk−1, x
+λx−, xk+1 . . . , xN , x0, x0, . . .). Let
x+λx− = x∗. Define x∗k,N = (x1, . . . , xk−1, x
∗, xk+1, . . . , xN , x0, x0, . . .). There-
fore, if there exist periods k, j and outcomes x+, x−, y+, y− ∈ X such that
x+k,N < x < x
−
k,N and y
+
j,M < y < y
−
j,M for some N and some M , we can find
λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] such that x ∼ x∗k,N and
y ∼ y∗j,M = (y1, . . . , yj−1, y
∗, yj+1, . . . , yM , x0, x0, . . .),
26
where y∗ = y+µy−. We have already shown that if x < y then U(x) ≥ U(y).
From x ∼ x∗k,N and y ∼ y
∗
j,M it therefore follows that:
U(x∗k,N) = U(x) and U(y
∗
j,M) = U(y).
Hence, from the assumption U(x) ≥ U(y) we obtain:
U(x∗k,N) ≥ U(y
∗
j,M).
Recall that U is an order-preserving function on X∗. Thus, x∗k,N < y
∗
j,M .
Since x ∼ x∗k,N and y ∼ y
∗
j,M , we obtain x < y.
Suppose now that there is no such k, j or outcomes x+, x−, y+, y− such
that x+k,N < x < x
−
k,N and y
+
j,M < y < y
−
j,M for some N and some M .
Then, using Axiom I6, we can conclude that either xt ∈ X
e for every t with
wt > 0 or yt ∈ X
e for every t with wt > 0. Assume that there is only an
upper bound to preferences; i.e., Xe ≡ {z ∈ X : z < z′ for every z′ ∈ X}.
Then U(x) ≥ U(y) means that xt ∈ X
e whenever wt > 0. Therefore,
U(x) = U(x), where x = (x, x, . . .) and x ∈ Xe. Hence, it follows by
monotonicity that x < y. In the case when there is only a lower bound, i.e.,
x ∈ Xe ≡ {z ∈ X : z′ < z for every z′ ∈ X}, the argument is similar.
Next, suppose that X is preference bounded above and below, i.e., there
exist x, x ∈ Xe with x < x < x for every x ∈ X . Assume that U(x) ≥ U(y).
We need to demonstrate that x < y. By monotonicity and continuity there
exist λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] such that x ∼ xλx and y ∼ xµx. Since by assumption
U(x) ≥ U(y) and U represents the preference order on constant streams, we
have U(xλx) ≥ U(xµx). By rearranging this inequality (λ−µ)(U(x)−U(x)),
and using U(x) > U(x) it follows that λ ≥ µ. Therefore, as x ∼ xλx and
y ∼ xµx and λ ≥ µ, we conclude that x < y.
Thus (w, u) is an AA representation for <.
Step 5. Uniqueness of wt. Assume that (w
′, u′) is another AA representa-
tion. Then, for any t we have wt > 0 if and only if w
′
t > 0. Consider the
set of all constant programs {x ∈ X∞ : x = (a, a, . . .), where a ∈ X}, which
is a mixture set. Applying (w′, u′) and (w, u) to this set we conclude that
u(a) > u(b) if and only if u′(a) > u′(b) for every a, b ∈ X . By Theorem 1
Fishburn (1982) it implies that u = Au′ + B for some A > 0 and some B.
Hence,
∞∑
t=1
wtu(xt) ≥
∞∑
t=1
wtu(yt) if and only if
∞∑
t=1
w′tu(xt) ≥
∞∑
t=1
w′tu(yt).
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For any t, s with t 6= s and any x′, x′′ ∈ X , let [x′, x′′]t,s denote the stream
with x′ in the tth position, x′′ in the sth position and x0 elsewhere. Fix t, s
with wt > 0 and ws > 0. Using non-triviality, choose some x
+, x− ∈ X such
that x+ ≻ x−. Define x = [x+, x+]t,s, y = [x
+, x−]t,s, z = [x
−, x−]t,s. From
the AA representation it follows that x ≻ y ≻ z. By continuity of the AA
representation there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that y ∼ xλz. Applying the AA
representation to y ∼ xλz we obtain
wtu(x
+) + wsu(x
−) = λ(wt + ws)u(x
+) + (1− λ)(wt + ws)u(x
−).
It follows that (1 − λ)wt = λws. Similarly, (1 − λ)w
′
t = λw
′
s. Therefore,
wt/ws = w
′
t/w
′
s. As this is true for any t, s, we obtain that w = Cw
′ for
some C > 0.
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